I. Introduction
International law recognizes that each individual has a right to a nationality, and it seeks to protect individuals from the condition of statelessness. Many international human rights instruments include provisions guaranteeing the right to a nationality to all persons and require appropriate states to grant individuals nationality where they would otherwise be stateless.
International rules governing nationality following state succession strongly affirm the international community's determination that states have an obligation to prevent statelessness.
International human rights law provides special protection for a child's right to a nationality, because of the particular vulnerability that children without a nationality endure.
The right to a nationality is important because nationality brings individuals under the political and legal protection of the state. National status entitles individuals to the benefits of citizenship and gives them a stake in the governance of their country. Moreover, the right to a nationality is critical to the protection of other fundamental rights, including those enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter). Although the right to a nationality is not explicitly guaranteed in the African Charter, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Commission) has recognized the critical role of this right in the protection of other fundamental human rights. The African Commission has found unenumerated rights to be implied in the African Charter when they are pivotal for securing other rights explicitly guaranteed in the African Charter. Because the right to a nationality is a necessary condition for the protection of these other rights, the African Commission should find the right to a nationality to be implicit in the African Charter.
Even if the right to a nationality is not found to be an implied African Charter right, both treaty and customary international law prohibit the denial of nationality on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds. Therefore, individuals of a particular ethnicity, race, or national origin cannot be discriminated against by the state in its conferral of national status. The state cannot, under international law, discriminate by requiring certain individuals to meet a higher standard for proving their nationality. Similarly, the state cannot impose arbitrary requirements on certain classes of people without violating the international prohibition against arbitrary and discriminatory treatment.
Because international law recognizes an individual right to a nationality, because the right is critical to the realization of other human rights, and because international law prohibits arbitrary and discriminatory treatment in granting national status, the Allard K. Lowenstein
International Human Rights Clinic respectfully submits that the African Commission should find that Kenya has deprived the Nubians of their right to a nationality.
II. International Law Recognizes an Individual's Right to a Nationality
International law and, in particular, international human rights law, has increasingly recognized an individual's right to a nationality. The right to a nationality generally requires appropriate states to grant nationality to individuals who would otherwise be stateless. This is particularly true in the context of state succession, where international law requires a successor state to grant nationality to an individual with an effective link to the nation if she would otherwise be stateless.
A. International Human Rights Instruments Guarantee the Right to a Nationality
International declarations, treaties, and United Nations bodies recognize the international right to a nationality. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which articulates wellrecognized principles of international law, 1 declares in Article 15 that "[e]veryone has the right to a nationality." 2 Shortly after the passage of the Universal Declaration, the U.N. Economic and Social Council "demanded action 'to ensure that everyone shall have an effective right to a nationality.'" 3 International treaties also explicitly provide for the right to a nationality. The
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which Kenya is a party, specifically requires states parties to "guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: . . . . (iii) The right to nationality." 4 The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness additionally insists that a "Contracting State shall not deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless" except under limited enumerated circumstances. 5 Regional human rights treaties also recognize the right to a nationality, and regional human rights courts have affirmed the right. The American Convention on Human Rights explicitly embraces the right to a nationality, proclaiming that "[e]very person has the right to a nationality." 6 Under the American Convention, this right is non-derogable and cannot be 2 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., art. 15 to a nationality as an "inalienable human right." 14 In 2005, the Commission passed a resolution reaffirming Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, emphasizing "that the right to a nationality of every human person is a fundamental human right." 15 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) has also based findings on the human right to a nationality. In 1996, for example, the Special Rapporteur found that the government of Zaire had violated the Banyarwanda and Banyamulengue peoples' right to nationality guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the customary international law prohibition against statelessness. 16 Commentators acknowledge that international law has increasingly recognized the right to a nationality. Already in the 1990s, scholars noted the emergence of this right. One scholar explained:
[I]t can be safely concluded that there is a clear trend in international law towards a gradual recognition of an individual's right to nationality. Since the Second World War, the international law of human rights has developed at an unprecedented pace. Many international instruments affording protection of fundamental human rights irrespective of frontier or nationality have been ratified. . . . Recognition of these rights as fundamental human rights and the concerted efforts to guarantee these rights in international law exert a strong influence on the development of the right to nationality. 17 Authoritative international law commentators have also confirmed the emergence of an international right to a nationality. After an eight-year study, the International Law Association, a worldwide association of international law scholars and practitioners that seeks to clarify and develop international law, 18 adopted a set of minimum standards to govern states of emergency In addition to recognizing a general right to a nationality, international law has emphasized the right of children to a nationality. A child's right to a nationality is particularly important because of the vulnerability of children without a nationality. 22 In many instances, children who are unable to prove nationality or citizenship lack access to critical benefits such as health care or education. Recognizing this fact, many human rights instruments specifically address children's right to a nationality and right to register their birth. 23 For example, the 1989
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has been ratified by 193 nations, including Kenya, 24 provides that children "shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have . . . the right to acquire a nationality" and requires state parties to "undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality." 25 The Committee on the Rights of the Child, the body created by the Convention on the Rights of the Child to review states' reports on their compliance with the Convention's provisions, has explained that the failure to register children's birth "implies the non-recognition of these children as persons before the law, which will affect the level of enjoyment of their fundamental rights and freedoms." 26 Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also guarantees that "[e]very child has the right to acquire a nationality." 27 International treaties dealing with the problem of statelessness also highlight the importance of conferring nationality on children who would otherwise be stateless. 28 The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness has several provisions intended to protect children; for example, it provides that a child born in wedlock in the territory of a state party whose mother is a national of the state and who would otherwise be stateless should be granted that state's nationality. 29
Many regional human rights instruments similarly protect a child's right to a nationality. 28 For example, the 1930 Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws provides that a child born to parents with no nationality or unknown nationality in a state that does not automatically confer its nationality on persons born within its territory is entitled to the nationality of the state in which he is born. This was the first international attempt to codify the principle of jus soli, which mandates that nationality shall be based on where an individual is born and not on the nationality of his or her parents. Hague Convention of 1930, art. 15, supra note 2 ("Where the nationality of a State is not acquired automatically by reason of birth on its territory, a child born on the territory of that State of parents having no nationality, or of unknown nationality, may obtain the nationality of the said State."). 29 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 5, art. 1(3) ("[A]child born in wedlock in the territory of a Contracting State, whose mother has the nationality of that State, shall acquire at birth that nationality if it otherwise would be stateless."); see also id. art. 5(2) (governing the ability of a child born out of wedlock who loses the contracting state's nationality to recover that nationality). 30 African Union, List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Union Convention on African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, available at http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Charter%20on%20the%20Rights%20and%20Wel fare%20of%20the%20Child.pdf. 31 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 6(3)-(4), opened for signature July 11, 1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49. "Every minor child has the right to the measures of protection required by his condition as a minor on the part of his family, society, and the state." 32 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has interpreted this article to extend the right to a nationality, enshrined by Article 20 of the Convention, to children. 33 The European Convention on Nationality has similar provisions specifically guaranteeing a child's right to a nationality and requiring state parties to extend nationality to children found in their territory who would otherwise be stateless. 34 International and regional treaties, declarations and reports from international bodies, and expert commentary, therefore, all recognize the international right to a nationality and the particular right of children to a nationality. 32 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 19. 33 In the Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, supra note 9, ¶ 135, the Inter-American Court found a violation of Article 19 (rights of the child) of the American Convention on Human Rights by virtue of the fact that the Dominican state had denied the petitioner children its nationality, protected under Article 20 of the Convention. The Court explained: "The prevalence of the child's superior interest should be understood as the need to satisfy all the rights of the child, and this obliges the State and affects the interpretation of the other rights established in the Convention when the case refers to children." Id. ¶ 134. 34 European Convention on Nationality, supra note 11, art. 6. Article 6 provides:
Each State Party shall provide in its internal law for its nationality to be acquired ex lege by the following persons: a. children one of whose parents possesses, at the time of the birth of these children, the nationality of that State Party, subject to any exceptions which may be provided for by its internal law as regards children born abroad. b. foundlings found in its territory who would otherwise be stateless. Id. Furthermore, Recommendation No. R(99)18 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Avoidance and Reduction of Statelessness provides both that a state's nationality should be available to children whose parents possess its nationality and to children born on its territory who would otherwise be stateless. Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, 71st Mtg., adopted Dec. 15, 1999 [hereinafter Committee of Ministers, Avoidance of Statelessness Recommendation], available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=458313&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55 &BackColorLogged=FFAC75.
B. The Right to a Nationality Requires That States Grant Nationality to Individuals Who Would Otherwise Be Stateless, Particularly in the Context of State Succession

States Have an Obligation to Grant Nationality to Individuals Who Would Otherwise Be Stateless
International law dictates that, where an individual would otherwise be stateless, that is, without any recognized citizenship in a state, a state must grant that individual its nationality if the individual was born within the state's territory or has other important links to the state. 35 The prohibition against statelessness has been articulated in a number of binding international treaties. The first international effort to codify the prohibition against statelessness was the 1930 See, e.g., Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 5, art. 1 (requiring states to grant nationality "to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless"); see also discussion infra at note 60 (discussing effective link). Other international human rights instruments indicate that such a link may be established through descent or residence. The European Convention on Nationality, for example, provides that "[a]ccess to the nationality of a state should be possible whenever a person has a genuine and effective link with that state, in particular through birth, descent or residence. The international prohibition against statelessness extends not only to those who are de jure stateless, but also to those who are de facto stateless. When an individual is entitled to citizenship of a particular country but is unable to prove his nationality due to restrictive or discriminatory requirements or because the country does not acknowledge him as a national, he may be de facto stateless. "[A] de facto stateless person is normally regarded as a person who does possess a nationality but does not possess the protection of his State of nationality and who Helsinki produced the Helsinki Document, which contained recognition of the right to nationality and of states' obligations not to increase statelessness. The relevant section states: "The participating States [:] Recognize that everyone has the right to a nationality and that no one should be deprived of his/her nationality arbitrarily; Underline that all aspects of nationality will be governed by the process of law. They will, as appropriate, take measures, consistent with their constitutional framework not to increase statelessness . . . ." Declaration and Decisions from the Helsinki Summit, Helsinki, July 10, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1385, 1413 (1992) . 45 Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire, supra note 16, ¶ ¶ 84-85.
resides outside the territory of that State, i.e. a person whose nationality is ineffective." 46 The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for example, has found that unreasonably burdensome requirements for obtaining nationality rendered an individual effectively stateless; the Court held that the Dominican Republic was obligated to ensure that the procedure for acquiring nationality be "simple, accessible and reasonable, because, to the contrary, applicants could remain stateless." 47 If an individual is denied effective nationality, whether by operation of law or of fact, that individual is stateless, and the international prohibition against statelessness and protections guaranteed by the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness apply to him. 48
International Rules Governing Nationality in the Context of State Succession Demonstrate the Importance of Avoiding Statelessness
Out of concern for the prevention of statelessness, international law has also recognized and defined states' obligations regarding nationality in the context of state succession. State succession occurs when one state "exercising sovereign powers over an inhabited territory is 46 PAUL WEISS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1086 (1962); see also Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, supra note 9, ¶ 142 (explaining that statelessness "arises from the lack of a nationality, when an individual does not qualify to receive this under the State's laws, owing to arbitrary deprivation or the granting of a nationality that, in actual fact, is not effective") (emphasis added). Although refugees are a classic example of de facto stateless persons, other individuals that lack national protection may be de facto stateless, as well. See Executive Committee, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ¶ 9, 26th Mtg., 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. No. EC/1995/SCP/CRP.2 (June 2, 1995) ("While initially it was assumed that all de facto stateless persons were refugees . . . it is now apparent that . . . there are individuals who do not qualify as refugees and whose nationality status is unclear. The situation of such a person in terms of a lack of national protection may be identical to that of a de jure stateless person."). 47 Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, supra note 9, ¶ 239. 48 habitual residents of the successor state have the right to opt for the nationality of either the predecessor or the successor state: 1) if they would otherwise become stateless as a result of the succession; and 2) if they have "an appropriate connection with that state." 53 The ILC emphasized that this provision was made obligatory in recognition of the need to prevent statelessness. 54 Any child who is born in a successor state after the succession and who has not acquired any nationality also has the right to the nationality of that state. 55
The European Convention on Nationality emphasizes a similar concern for the need to avoid statelessness in the context of state succession 56 ). According to one commentator, the Harvard articles reflected "the practice recognized at the time." DONNER, supra note 48, at 262. 53 Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 51, art. 11(2) ("Each State concerned shall grant a right to opt for its nationality to persons concerned who have appropriate connection with that State if those persons would otherwise become stateless as a result of the succession of states."); see also id. art. 2(f) (defining a "person concerned" as "every individual who, on the date of the succession of States, had the nationality of the predecessor State and whose nationality may be affected by such succession"). The ILC also clarified that the term "appropriate connection" should be interpreted more broadly than the term "genuine link" and includes "habitual residence, appropriate legal connection with one of the constituent units of the The ICJ explained: [International arbitrators] have given their preference to the real and effective nationality, that which accorded with the facts, that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of the States whose nationality is involved. Different factors are taken into consideration . . . : the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such as the center of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc. . . . Id. at 22. 61 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 657 (5th ed. 1999) ("[T]he evidence is overwhelming in support of the view that the population follows the change of sovereignty in matters of nationality."). Brownlie concludes that, according to international law, in the case of state succession, individuals with an effective link to the successor state should be granted that state's nationality. Id. at 659 ("The general principle is that of a substantial connection with the territory concerned by citizenship or residence or family relation to a qualified person. . . ."); see also Chan, supra note 17, at 12 ("[U]pon change of sovereignty, all persons who have a genuine and effective link with the new State will automatically acquire the nationality of the new State. It is primarily within the competence of each State to determine what constitutes a genuine and effective link in the conferment of its nationality, subject to the presumption of avoidance of statelessness and the duty not to enact or apply any law on a international law scholar notes, "International organizations involved in recent state successions have on several occasions expressed legal opinions to the effect that a successor state is obliged to extend nationality to individuals with a genuine effective link to the territory in question." 62 International law, thus, requires that, in cases of state succession, a successor state must grant its nationality to certain individuals with an effective or appropriate link to that country where those individuals would otherwise be stateless. This requirement evidences a strong international presumption against statelessness.
III. Because the Right to a Nationality Is Necessary to Prevent Statelessness and to Protect Other Fundamental Rights, Including Those Enshrined in the African Charter, the African Commission Should Find That This Critical Right Is Implicit in the African Charter
The internationally recognized right to a nationality is not explicitly guaranteed by the African Charter, but it is crucial for the protection of other fundamental African Charter rights.
When the African Commission has determined that an unenumerated right is essential for the protection of other fundamental enumerated rights, it has found such a right to be implied in the
Charter. The African Commission should therefore affirm the importance of the right to a discriminatory basis."). Although one prominent scholar, Paul Weis, has argued that opinio juris has not yet coalesced enough to lead to a conclusion that this principle is customary international law, see WEIS, supra note 46, at 143-44, Weis acknowledges that there is an international law "presumption" that individuals should acquire the successor state's nationality, see id. at 144 ("As a rule, however, States have conferred their nationality on the former nationals of the predecessor State, and in this regard one may say that there is . . . a presumption of international law that municipal law has this effect."); see also nationality as a necessary condition for the protection of other rights by finding that it is implicit in the African Charter.
A. The Right to a Nationality Is Critical for Protecting a Wide Range of Fundamental Rights
Nationality is the legal bond between the state and the individual that guarantees the enjoyment and performance of reciprocal rights and duties. 63 The result, in practice, is that An individual without a nationality is also denied many of the domestic protections afforded nationals. Freedom of movement, reentry into the country, and access to health care and education are often conditioned upon an individual's ability to prove her nationality. When an 63 See Nottebohm Case, supra note 60, at 23 ("According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties."). 64 Blackman, supra note 62, at 1148. 65 Id. at 1150.
individual is stateless, whether de jure or de facto, 66 the basic human, social, and political rights to which she is entitled are more susceptible to state violation. International and regional human rights jurisprudence, therefore, has recognized the right to a nationality as a necessary guarantor of these fundamental rights.
The African Commission itself has affirmed the essential role that nationality plays in protecting other rights, finding that withholding the right to a nationality deprives an individual vulnerability." 79 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has also emphasized that the right to nationality "is properly considered to be one of the most important rights of man, after the right to life itself, because all the prerogatives, guarantees and benefits man derives from his membership in a political and social community-the State-stem from or are supported by this right." 80
The African Commission's holdings are consistent with decisions of other international and regional bodies recognizing that the right to a nationality is essential for the protection of other fundamental rights.
B. Because the Right to a Nationality Plays a Critical Role in Guaranteeing Other Rights Provided for Under the African Charter, the African Commission Should Affirm and Protect the Right to a Nationality by Finding It Implicit in the African Charter
Given the critical role that the right to a nationality plays in protecting other rights explicitly guaranteed by the African Charter, the African Commission should affirm and protect the right to a nationality by finding it to be implicit in the African Charter. The African
Commission has read rights into the African Charter where those rights, although not explicitly enumerated, are critical for the realization of other provisions of the African Charter and find support in international human rights law. In The Social and Economic Rights Action and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, the African Commission held:
Although the right to housing or shelter is not explicitly provided for under the African Charter, the corollary of the combination of the provisions protecting the right to enjoy the best attainable state of mental and physical health, . . . the right to property, and the protection accorded to the family forbids the wanton 79 Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, supra note 9, ¶ 142. The African Commission also held that although there is no explicit right to food in the African Charter, this right is implied by "the right to life (Art. 4), the right to health (Art. 16) and the right to economic, social and cultural development (Art. 22)." 85 The African Commission ultimately concluded that the Nigerian government had violated both the explicit rights protected by the African Charter and the separate implicit right to food. 86 The African Commission based its decision to find unenumerated rights implicit in the African Charter on these rights' importance in guaranteeing the protection of enumerated rights.
Although the African Charter does not explicitly provide the right to a nationality, the right is essential for guaranteeing rights enumerated in the African Charter, including the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the law; 87 the right to recognition of one's legal status; 88 "the right to freedom of movement" and to leave any country and return to one's own; 89 81 access to public property and services in strict equality of all persons before the law;" 90 the right "to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions" and to equal pay for equal work; 91 the right to education; 92 and the right to be equal with all other peoples and to not be dominated by another. 93 The African Commission should therefore affirm and protect the right to a nationality by finding that it is necessarily implied by the fundamental rights enumerated in the African Charter.
IV. Under Customary International Law and Treaty Law, States May Not Deny Individuals Nationality on Arbitrary or Discriminatory Grounds
Whether or not the African Commission chooses to find that the right to a nationality is implied in the African Charter, it is clear under the African Charter and international law that states may not discriminate in law or practice when providing people with or depriving them of nationality.
Well-established jus cogens norms of customary international law prohibit discrimination and arbitrary treatment. 94 Virtually all major international and regional human rights treaties 89 Id. art. 12(1)-(2 Indeed, the African Charter itself guarantees non-discrimination and equal protection:
Article 2: Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.
Article 3: (1) Every individual shall be equal before the law.
(2) Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law. 96
The prohibition against arbitrary and discriminatory treatment applies explicitly to the right to a nationality. For example, although recognizing that a state has authority to decide the "equal and effective protection of the law and non-discrimination" as a "peremptory legal principle"); BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 602 ("There is indeed a considerable support for the view that there is in international law today a legal principle of non-discrimination which applies in matters of race."). 95 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 27, art. 26 ("All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 2(2), entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."); Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 25, art. 2(1) ("States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status."); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, arts. 1(1), 24 (providing that "[t]he States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition" and that "[a]ll persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law"); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 13, art. 14 ("The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."); id. art. 7 ("All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law."). 96 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 87, arts. 2, 3. therefore makes clear that states may not arbitrarily or discriminatorily deprive individuals of nationality.
International bodies have likewise emphasized the prohibition against arbitrary or discriminatory deprivation of nationality. In 2005, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution expressing "deep concern at the arbitrary deprivation of persons or groups of When granting or denying nationality, states may not discriminate either in law or in practice. 105 As the Inter-American Court has held:
[T]he peremptory legal principle of the equal and effective protection of the law and non-discrimination determines that, when regulating mechanisms for granting nationality, States must abstain from producing regulations that are discriminatory or have discriminatory effects on certain groups of population when exercising their rights. Moreover, States must combat discriminatory practices at all levels, particularly in public bodies and, finally, must adopt the affirmative measures needed to ensure the effective right to equal protection for all individuals. 106 Thus, a state does not comply with the international prohibition against arbitrary and discriminatory treatment merely by enacting laws and regulations that appear on their face to apply equally to all. Instead, a state must ensure that the actual effect and implementation of these laws is not arbitrary or discriminatory.
Requiring individuals of particular ethnic or national origins to meet different, more burdensome requirements than others in order to establish their nationality or to obtain birth certificates has been found to violate the prohibition against arbitrary and discriminatory order to obtain nationality, the State acted arbitrarily, without using reasonable and objective criteria, and in a way that was contrary to the superior interest of the child, which constitutes discriminatory treatment." 109 The Court further noted that the Dominican Republic at times also allowed administrative officials to require "without any objective criteria" that children of the same age group meet a different number and type of requirements in order to register their birth. 110 Throughout its decision, the Court emphasized that this arbitrary treatment was "situated within the context of the vulnerable situation of the Haitian population and Dominicans of Haitian origin in the Dominican Republic." 111 When a state requires some individuals to provide additional or more burdensome evidence of nationality or birth than others, based on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds, it violates the international prohibition against arbitrary or discriminatory treatment.
States, therefore, have a jus cogens obligation, as well as international treaty obligations, to ensure that individuals are not denied nationality on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds. Even though a state's laws on their face may provide individuals with an equal right to nationality, enforcing these laws in an arbitrary or discriminatory way violates this international prohibition.
When a state requires certain individuals or groups to provide additional, more burdensome evidence of nationality than other similarly situated groups, international bodies have found the state in violation of the prohibition against arbitrary and discriminatory treatment. 109 Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, supra note 9, ¶ 166. 110 Id. ¶ 161 ("In the Dominican Republic the lists of requirements have been drawn up based on the age of the child to be registered, but distinctions have also been made involving the number and type of requirements for the same age group, according to the competent authority who applies them, without any objective criteria being followed."). 111 Id. ¶ 168.
V. Conclusion
International law recognizes the right to a nationality and has persistently affirmed the importance of eliminating statelessness, particularly in the case of state succession. Moreover, international human rights law affirms the critical role that nationality plays in protecting other access to employment and impeding their access to health care and education. 115 The international legal presumption that successor states will grant nationality to individuals with appropriate links to the country strengthens Kenya's obligation to grant effective citizenship. 116 Based on the facts stated in the Nubian Community Communication, international law requires Kenya to make effective the nationality of all Nubians because of their appropriate links to the state. If the African Commission finds that the right to a nationality is implicit in the African Charter, the facts alleged in the Nubian Community Communication would justify a finding that Kenya is depriving the Nubians of this right.
Even if the Commission does not find that the right to a nationality is implicit in the African Charter, the Charter and international law clearly prohibit the deprivation of nationality on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds. The Nubian Community Communication presents facts that, if proven, demonstrate that Kenya employs discriminatory administrative practices that deny the Nubian people effective nationality and render them stateless. The Nubians are required to present far more evidence of birth and ancestry than other individuals seeking proof of Kenyan citizenship and face much longer delays in processing requests for identification 115 Id. at 4. 116 The British government forcibly recruited the Nubians into the British army and, following World War II, took the Nubians to Kenya. The British subsequently refused to repatriate them to the then-British colony of Sudan. Id. at 2. After the British transferred power to the Kenyan government in 1963, Kenya became the successor state of the British colony. The Nubian Community Communication alleges that at the time of decolonization, the Nubians had established habitual residence in Kenya and were "British subjects under colonial rule." Id. The Communication further notes that "the British Nationality Act of 1949 defines a British protected person as one who, being a British subject, had a close relationship either through birth or descent with the UK and its remaining colonies. This group included indigenous populations and ethnic communities living in Kenya under colonial rule, like the Nubians." Id. at 3. Under international law, therefore, if the Nubians were considered to have the nationality of the predecessor state, they were presumably entitled to Kenyan citizenship at the time of transfer. The Nubians' effective link to Kenya strengthens their claim to Kenyan citizenship under international law in the context of state succession. Additionally, any Nubian child born in Kenya after the succession who had not acquired the nationality of any other state, would be presumed entitled to Kenyan nationality under international law. See supra Part II(B)(2).
